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Ilaria Brunetti, Rachid El-Azouzi and Eitan Altman
Evolutionary Game Theory has been originally developed and formalized
by [247], in order to model the evolution of animal species and it has soon
become an important mathematical tool to predict and even design evolution in
many fields, others than biology. It mainly focuses on the dynamical evolution
of the strategies adopted in a population of interacting individuals, where the
notion of equilibrium adopted is that of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS,
[247]), implying robustness against a mutation (i.e. a change in the strategy)
of a small fraction of the population. This is a stronger condition than the
standard Nash equilibrium concept, which requires robustness against deviation
of a single user. On the importance of the ESS for understanding the evolution
of species, Dawkins writes in his book ”The Selfish Gene” [290]: ”we may come
to look back on the invention of the ESS concept as one of the most important
advances in evolutionary theory since Darwin.” He further specifies: ”Maynard
Smith’s concept of the ESS will enable us, for the first time, to see clearly how a
collection of independent selfish entities can come to resemble a single organized
whole.
Evolutionary game theory is nowadays considered as an important
enrichment of game theory and it’s applied in a wide variety of fields,
spanning from social sciences [107] to computer science. Some examples of
applications in computer science can be found in multiple access protocols [250],
multihoming[240] and resources competition in the Internet [298].
This theory is usually adopted in situations where individuals belonging to a
very large population are matched in random pairwise interactions. In classical
evolutionary games (EG), each individual constitutes a selfish player involved
in a non-cooperative game, maximizing its own utility, also said fitness, since in
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EG it’s originally assumed that individuals’ utility corresponds to the Darwinian
fitness, i.e. the number of offsprings. The fitness is defined as a function of
both the behavior (strategy) of the individual as well as of the distribution of
behaviors among the whole population, and strategies with higher fitness are
supposed to spread within the population. A behavior of an individual with a
higher fitness would thus result in a higher rate of its reproduction. We observe
that since strategies and fitness are associated to the individual, then classical
EG is restricted to describe populations in which the individual is the one that
is responsible for the reproduction and where the choice of its own strategies
is completely selfish. In biology, in some species like bees or ants, the one who
interacts is not the one who reproduces. This implies that the Darwinian fitness
is related to the entire swarm and not to a single bee and thus, standard EG
models excludes these species in which the single individual which reproduces
is not necessarily the one that interacts with other players. Furthermore, in
many species, we find altruistic behaviors, which favors the group the playing
individual belongs to, but which may hurt the single individual. Altruistic
behaviors are typical of parents toward their children: they may incubate them,
feed them or protect them from predator’s at a high cost for themselves. Another
example can be found in flock of birds: if a bird sees a predator, then it gives
an alarm call to warn the rest of the flock to protect the group, but attracting
the predators attention to itself. Also the stinging behavior of bees is another
example of altruism, since it serves to protect the hive but its lethal for the bee
which strives. In human behavior, many phenomena where individuals do care
about other’s benefits in their groups or about their intentions can be observed
and thus the assumption of selfishness becomes inconsistent with the many real
world behavior of individuals belonging to a population.
Founders of classical EG seem to have been well aware of this problem.
Indeed, Vincent writes in [278] ”Ants seem to completely subordinate any
individual objectives for the good of the group. On the other hand, the social
foraging of hyenas demonstrates individual agendas within a tight-knit social
group (Hofer and East, 2003). As evolutionary games, one would ascribe
strategies and payoffs to the ant colony, while ascribing strategies and payoffs
to the individual hyenas of a pack.”
In the case of ants, the proposed solution is thus to model the ant colony
as a player. Within the CEG paradigm, this would mean that we have to
consider interactions between ant colonies. The problem of this approach is
that it doesn’t allow to model behavior at the level of the individual.
In this chapter we present a new model for evolutionary games in which the
concept of the agent as a single individual is replaced by that of the agent as
a whole group of individuals. We define a new equilibrium concept, named
Group Equilibrium Stable Strategy (GESS), allowing to model competition
between individuals in a population in which the whole group shares a common
utility. Even if we still consider pairwise interactions among individuals, our
perspective is substantially different: we assume that individuals are simple
actors of the game, maximizing the utility of their group instead of their own
one. We first define the GESS, deriving it in several ways and exploring its
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major characteristics. The main interest of this work is to study how this new
concept changes the profile of population and to explore the relationship between
GESS and standard Nash equilibrium and ESS. We characterize the GESS and
we show how the evolution and the equilibrium are influenced by the groups’
size as well as by their immediate payoff. We compute some interesting in a
particular example of a multiple access games, in which the payoff related to
local interactions also depend on the type of individuals that are competing,
and not only the strategy used. In such application, we evaluate the impact of
altruism behavior on the performance of the system.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first provide in section 2.1 the
needed background on evolutionary games. In the section 2.2 we then study
the new natural concept GESS and the relationship between GESS and ESS or
Nash equilibrium. The characterization of the GESS is studied in section 2.3.
Section 2.4 provides some numerical illustration through some famous examples
in evolutionary games. In section 2.5 we study the multiple access control in
slotted Aloha under altruism behavior. The paper closes with a summary in
section 5.6
2.1 Classical Evolutionary Games and ESS
We consider an infinite population of players and we assume that each individual
disposes of the same set of pure strategies K = {1, 2, ..,m}. Each individual
repeatedly interacts with an other individual randomly selected within the
population. Individuals may use a mixed strategy p ∈ ∆(K), where ∆(K) =
{p ∈ Rm+ |
∑
i∈K pi = 1}, where each vector p corresponds to a probability
measure over the set of actions K. This serves to represent those cases where an
individual has the capacity to produce a variety in behaviors. A mixed strategy
p can also be interpreted as the vector of densities of individuals adopting a
certain pure strategy, such that each component pi represents the fraction of
the population using strategy i ∈ K. However, in the original formulation of
evolutionary game theory, it is not necessary to make the distinction between
population-level and individual-level variability for infinite population [247].
Let now focus on the case of monomorphic populations, i.e., on the case
in which individuals use mixed strategy. We define by J(p,q) the expected
payoff of a given individual if it uses a mixed action p when interacting with an
individual playing the mixed action q. Actions with higher payoff (or ”fitness”)
are thus expected to spread faster in the population. If we define a payoff matrix
A and consider p and q to be column vectors, then J(p,q) = p′Aq and the
payoff function J is bilinear, i.e. it is linear both in p and in q. A mixed action
q is said to be a Nash equilibrium if
∀p ∈ ∆(K), J(q,q) ≥ J(p,q) (2.1)
As we mentioned above, in evolutionary games the most important concept of
equilibrium is the ESS, introduced by [247] as a strategy that, if adopted by the
whole population, can not be invaded by a different (”mutant”) strategy. More
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precisely, if we suppose that the entire population adopt a strategy q and that
a small fraction ε of individuals (mutants) plays another strategy p, then q is
evolutionarily stable against p if
J(q, εp + (1− ε)q) > J(p, εp + (1− ε)q) (2.2)
The definition of ESS thus corresponds to a robustness property against
deviations by a (small) fraction of the population. This is an important
difference that distinguishes the equilibrium in a large population as seen in
evolutionary games and the standard Nash equilibrium often used in economic
context, where the robustness is defined against the possible deviation of each
single agent. Since in evolutionary games context we deal with very large
populations, it is more likely to expect that some group of individuals may
deviate from the incumbent strategy and thus robustness against deviations by a
single user would not be sufficient to guarantee that the mutant strategy will not
spread among a growing portion of the population. By defining the ESS through
the following equivalent definition, it’s possible to establish the relationship
between ESS and Nash Equilibrium (NE). The proof of the equivalence between
the two definitions can be found in [280, Proposition 2.1] or [143, Theorem 6.4.1,
page 63].
Strategy q is an ESS if it satisfies the two conditions:
• Nash equilibrium condition:
J(q,q) ≥ J(p,q) ∀p ∈ K. (2.3)
• Stability condition:
J(p,q) = J(q,q)⇒ J(p,p) < J(q,p). ∀p 6= q (2.4)
The first condition (2.3) corresponds to the condition for a Nash equilibrium.
In fact, if inequality (2.3) is satisfied, then the fraction of mutations in will
increase, since it hasn’t an higher fitness, and thus a lower growth rate. If
the two strategies provide the same fitness but condition (2.4) holds, then
a population using q is ”weakly” immune against mutants using p. Indeed,
if the mutant’s population grows, then we shall frequently have individuals
with action q competing with mutants. In such cases, the inequality in (2.4),
J(p,p) < J(q,p), ensures that the growth rate of the original population
exceeds that of the mutants. In this sense an ESS can be seen as a refinement
of the Nash equilibrium.
2.2 New natural concept on evolutionary games
In this section we present our new concept for evolutionary games, where we
still consider pairwise interactions among individuals but the actual player of
the game is a whole group of these individuals. We suppose that the population
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is composed of N groups, Gi, i = 1, 2, .., N , where the normalized size of each
group Gi is denoted by αi, with
∑N
j=1 αi = 1.
Each individual can meet a member of its own group or of a different one,
in random pairwise interactions, and disposes of a finite set of actions, denoted
by K = {a1, a2, .., aM}. Let pik be the probability that an individual in the
group Gi chooses an action ak ∈ K. Each group i is associated to the vector of
probabilities pi = (pi1, pi2, .., piM ) where
∑M
l=1 pil = 1, giving the distribution
of actions within the group. By assuming that each individual can interact with
any other individual with equal probability, then the expected utility of a player





where p−i is the strategies profile of all the other groups (but i) and J(pi,pj)
is the immediate expected utility of an individual player adopting strategy pi
against an opponent playing pj .
2.2.1 Group Equilibrium Stable Strategy
The definition of GESS is related to a notion of robustness against deviations
within each group. In this context, there are two possible equivalent
interpretations of an ε− deviation toward pi. If the group Gi plays according
to the incumbent strategy qi, an ε− deviation, can be thought as:
1. A small deviation in the strategy by all members of a group, shifting to
the new group’s strategy p̄i = εpi + (1− εqi) ;
2. The second is a (possibly large) deviation of a fraction ε of individuals
belonging to Gi, playing the mutant strategy pi.
After an ε−deviation under both interpretations the profile of the whole
population becomes αiεpi + αi(1− ε)qi +
∑
j 6=i αjqj . Then the average payoff














where Ω(pi,qi) := J(pi,pi)− J(pi,qi)− J(qi,pi)) + J(qi,qi).
Definition 1. A strategy q = (q1,q2, ..,qN ) is a GESS if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
∀pi 6= qi, there exists some εpi ∈ (0, 1), which may depend on pi, such that for
all ε ∈ (0, εpi)
Ui(p̄i,q−i) < Ui(qi,q−i), (2.7)
where p̄i = εpi + (1− ε)qi.
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From equation (2.7), this implies that strategy q is a GESS if the two
following conditions hold:
• ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]M
Fi(pi,q) := αiΩ(pi,qi)− Ui(pi,q−i) + Ui(qi,q−i) ≥ 0, (2.8)
• ∃pi 6= qi such that:
If Fi(pi,q) = 0⇒ Ω(pi,qi) < 0 (2.9)
Remark 1. The second condition (2.9) can be rewritten as
Ui(qi,q−i) > Ui(pi,q−i)
which coincide to the definition of the strict Nash equilibrium of the game
composed by N groups, each of them maximizing its own utility.
2.2.2 GESS and standard ESS
Here we analyze the relationship between our new equilibrium concept, the
GESS and the standard ESS.
Proposition 1. Consider games such that the immediate expected reward is
symmetric, i.e. J(p,q) = J(q,p). Then any ESS is a GESS.
Proof. Let q = (q, .., q) be an ESS. From the symmetry of the payoff function
and equation (2.8), we get:
Fi(pi,q) = −
(




αj(J(pi, q)− J(q, q)
)
= −2αi(J(pi, q)− J(q, q))−
∑
j 6=i
αj(J(pi, q)− J(q, q))
= −(1 + αi)(J(pi, q)− J(q, q)) ≥ 0
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of J and the last inequality
follows form the fact that q is an ESS and satisfies (2.3). This means that q
satisfies the first condition of GESS (2.8). Assume now that Fi(pi, q) = 0 for
some pi 6= q, previous equations imply that J(pi,q) = J(q,q). Thus the second
condition (2.9) becomes Ω(pi,qi) = J(pi,q) − J(q,q) < 0 which coincide with
the second condition of ESS (2.4). This completes the proof.
2.2.3 Nash equilibrium and GESS
In the classical evolutionary games, the ESS can be seen as a refinement of a
Nash equilibrium, since all ESSs are Nash equilibria while the converse is not
true. In order to study and characterize this relationship in our context, we
2.3. ANALYSIS OF N -GROUPS GAMES WITH TWO STRATEGIES 13
define the game between groups. There are N players in which each player has
a finite set of pure strategies K = {1, 2, ..,m}; let Ui(qi,q−i) be the utility of
player i when using mixed strategy qi against a population of players using
q−i = (q1, . . . ,qi−1,qi+1, . . . ,qN ).
Definition 2. A strategy q = (q1,q2, ..,qN ) is a Nash Equilibrium if ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , N}
Ui(qi,q−i) ≥ Ui(pi,q−i) (2.10)
for every mixed strategy pi 6= qi . If the inequality is a stric one, then q is a
strict Nash equilibrium.
From the definition of the strict Nash equilibrium, it is easy to see that any
strict Nash equilibrium is a GESS defined in equation (2.7). But in our context,
we address several questions on the relationship between the GESS, ESS and
the Nash equilibrium defined in (2.10). For the sake of simplicity, we restrict
to the case of two-strategies games. Before studying them, we introduce here
some necessary definitions.
Definition 3. • A fully mixed strategy q is a strategy such that all the
actions available for a group have positive probability, i.e., 0 < qij < 1
∀(i, j) ∈ I × K.
• A mixer (resp. pure) group i is the group that uses a mixed (resp. pure)
strategy 0 < qi < 1 (resp. qi ∈ {0, 1}).
• An equilibrium with mixed and non mixed strategies is an equilibrium in
which there is at least one pure group and a mixer group.
2.3 Analysis of N-groups games with two
strategies
In this section we present a simple case, with N -groups games disposing of two
strategies. The two available pure strategies are A and B and the payoff matrix







where Pij , i, j = A, B is the payoff of the first (row) individual if it plays
strategy i against the second (column) individual playing strategy j. We assume
that the two individuals are symmetric and hence payoffs of the column player
are given by P t, i.e. the transposed of P . According to the definition of GESS,
q is a GESS if it satisfies the conditions (2.8)-(2.9), which can be rewritten here
as:
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• ∀pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, .., N :
Fi(pi,q) = (qi − pi)
(
αi(J(qi, 1)− J(qi, 0)) +
N∑
j=1




• If F (pi,q) = 0 for some pi 6= qi, then:
(pi − qi)2∆ < 0 =⇒ ∆ < 0 (2.12)
where ∆ = a− b− c+ d.
2.3.1 Characterization of fully mixed GESS
In this section we are interested in characterizing the full mixed GESS q.
According to (4.4), a full mixed equilibrium q = (q1, . . . , qN ) is a GESS if
it satisfies the condition (4.5) where the equality must holds for all p ∈ [0, 1].
This yields to the following equation: ∀i = 1, . . . N ,
αi(J(qi, 1)− J(qi, 0)) +
N∑
j=1
αj(J(1, qj)− J(0, qj)) = 0
which can be rewritten as













Proposition 2. If ∆ < 0 and 0 < q∗i < 1, i = 1, . . . , N , then there exists a
unique fully mixed GESS equilibrium given by (2.13).
Note that the fully mixed GESS is a strict Nash equilibrium since the
condition (4.5) corresponds to the definition of the strict Nash equilibrium (see
remark 1), under the condition F (p, q1, . . . , qN ) = 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
2.3.2 Characterization of strong GESS
We say that an equilibrium is a strong GESS if it satisfies the strict inequality
(4.4) for all groups. As we did above for the fully mixed GESS, we expicit here
the condition for the existence of a strong GESS. Note that all groups have to
use pure strategy in a strong GESS. With no loss of generality, we assume that
a pure strong GESS can be represented by nA, where nA ∈ {1, ..., N} denotes
that the nA first groups use A pure strategy and remaining N−nA groups chose
strategy B. For example nA = N (resp. nA = 0) means that all groups choose
pure strategy A (resp. B).
2.3. ANALYSIS OF N -GROUPS GAMES WITH TWO STRATEGIES 15
Proposition 3. If a 6= c or b 6= d, then every N-player game with two strategies
has a GESS. We distinguish the following possibilities for the strong GESS:
i. If a− c > maxi(αi) · (b− a) then nA = N is a strong GESS;
ii. If b− d < mini(αi)(d− c) then nA = 0 is a strong GESS;





αj(b−d). If αi(d−c) > H(na) >
αi(b− a) then nA is a strong GESS.
Proof. In order to prove that a strategy nA = N is a GESS, we have to impose
the strict inequality, i.e.: ∀pi 6= 1 for i ∈ {1, .., nA} and ∀pi 6= 0 for i ∈
{nA + 1, .., N}
Fi(pi, 1nA , 0N−nA) > 0
We provide here the necessary conditions of the existence in the case nA = N ;
the other cases straightforward follow from the players’ symmetry assumption.
We now suppose that (nA = N) is a strong GESS. The inequality (4.4)








= (pi − 1)
(
αi(a− b) + a− c)
)
< 0,
Since pi < 1, one has αi(b − a) < a− c ∀i. This completes the proof of (i).
To show conditions of the other strong GESSs, we follow the lines of the proof
of (i).
2.3.3 Characterization of weak GESS
We define a weak GESS as an equilibrium in which at least one group uses a
strategy that satisfies the condition (4.5) with equality. Here we distinguish two
different situations: the equilibrium with no mixer group and the equilibrium
with mixer and no mixer groups. Conditions for the equilibrium with no mixed
strategy are given by Proposition 3 with at the least one group satisfying
it with equality and ∆ < 0. In what follows we thus focus only on the
equilibrium with mixer and no mixer groups. Without loss of generality, we
assume that an equilibrium with mixed and non mixed strategies, can be
represented by (nA, nB ,q) where nA denotes that group i for i = 1.., nA (resp.
i = nA + 1, .., nA + nB) uses strategy A (resp. B). The remaining groups
N − nA − nB are mixers in which qi is the probability to choose the strategy A
by group i.
Proposition 4. Let either a 6= c or b 6= d and ∆ < 0. (nA, nB ,q) is a weak
GESS if:
αi∆ + d− b+ αi(c− d) + ∆(αnA + y) ≥ 0, i = 1, .., nA
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Proof. See technical report
2.4 Some Examples
In this section we analyze a number of examples with two players and two
strategies.
2.4.1 Hawk and Dove Game
One of the most studied examples in EG theory is the Hawk-Dove game, first
introduced by Maynard Smith and Price in ”The Logic of Animal Conflict”.
This game serves to represent a competition between two animals for a resource.
Each animal can follow one of two strategies, either Hawk or Dove, where Hawk
corresponds to an aggressive behavior, Dove to a non-aggressive one. So, if two
Hawks meet, they involve in a fight, where one of them obtain the resource
and the other is injured, with equal probability. A Hawk always wins against a
Dove, but there is no fight, so the Dove looses the resource but it’s not injured,
whereas if two Doves meet they equally share the resource. The payoff matrix
associated to the game is the following:
( H D
H 12 (V − C) V
D 0 V/2
)
where C represent the cost of the fight, and V is the benefit associated to the
resource. We assume that C > V .
In standard GT, this example belongs to the class of anti-coordination games,
which always have two strict pure strategy NEs and one non-strict, mixed
strategy NE. In this case the two strict pure equilibria are (H,D) and (D,H),
and the mixed-one is: q∗ = VC . The latter is the only ESS: even if the two
pure NE are strict, being asymmetric they can’t be ESSs. We now set V = 2
and C = 3 and we study the Hawk and Dove game in our groups framework,
considering two groups of normalized size α and 1− α.
We find that the GESSs and the strict NE always coincides. More precisely
we obtain that:
• for 0 < α < 0.25 the game has one strong GESS (H,D) and a weak GESS
(H, q2) ;
• for 0.25 < α < 0.37: one weak GESS (H, q2);
• for 0.37 < α < 0.5 one weak GESS, (q∗1 , q∗2);
We observe that the size of groups has a strong impact on the behavior
of players: in the first interval of α−values we remark that the GESS is not
unique; if the size of the first group increases (which implies that the second
one decreases), the probability that the second group plays aggressively against
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the pure aggressive strategy of the first one increases until we get into the third
interval, where both players are mixers. The mixed equilibrium q∗1 is decreasing
in α: this is because, as we supposed that an individual can interact with
members of its own group, when increasing α, the probability of meeting an
individual in the same group increases and thus the individual tend to adopt a
less aggressive behavior.










































Figure 2.1: The global level of aggressiveness in the two-groups population for
the different GESSs, as a function of α
2.4.2 Stag Hunt Game
We now consider a well-known example which belonging to the class of
coordination games, the Stag Hunt game. The story modeled by this game
has been described by J-J. Rousseau: two individuals go hunting; if they hunt
together cooperating, they can hunt a stag; otherwise, if hunting alone, a hunter
can only get a hare. In this case, collaboration is thus rewarding for players. It
serves to represent a conflict between social and safely cooperation. The payoff





where S and H stand respectively for Stag and Hare and a > c ≥ d > b.
Coordination games are characterized by two strict, pure strategy NEs and
one non-strict, mixed strategy NE, which are, respectively, the risk dominant
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Figure 2.2: The global level of cooperation in the two-groups population for the
different GESSs, as a function of α.
equilibrium (H,H), the payoff dominant one (S, S) and the symmetric mixed





We set here a = 2, b = 0, c = 1, d = 1 and we determine the equilibria of
the two groups game as a function of α. We find that the strict GESSs and
the strict NEs don’t coincide, since we obtain strict GESSs but not NEs. The
two-groups Stag-Hunt Game only have the pure-pure strict NE (S, S), for all
values of α, while for the GESSs we obtain that:
• for 0 < α < 0.5 the game admits two pure-pure strong GESSs: (S, S) and
(H,H);
• for 0.25 < α < 0.5 the game admits three pure-pure strong GESSs: (S, S)
and (H,H) and (S,H);
• the game doesn’t admit any strict mixed NE.
2.4.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
We consider another classical example in game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
which belongs to a third class of games, the pure dominance class.
The story to imagine is the following: two criminals are arrested and
separately interrogated; they can either accuse the other criminal, either remain
silent. If both of them accuse the other (defect - D), then they will be both
imprisoned for 2 years. If only one accuse the other, the accused is punished
with 3 years of jail while the other is free. If both remain silent (cooperate -C),
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where c > a > d > b.
In standard GT, pure dominance class games have a unique pure, strict and
symmetric NE, which also is the unique ESS; in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it’s
(D,D).
We set a = 2, b = 0, c = 3, d = 1 and we study the two-groups corresponding
game. As in the previous example, we find strict GESSs which are not strict
NEs. In particular, we have that:
• (C,C) is always a GESS and a strict NE for all values of α;
• (D,D) is a GESS for all values of α but it is never a strict NE;
• (C,D) (symmetrically (D,C) ) is always a GESS and a strict NE for
0.5 < α < 1 (symmetrically 0 < α < 0.5);
• the game doesn’t admit mixed GESSs;
For any value of α, the two groups game thus admits three pure GESSs and
two pure strict NEs .





























Figure 2.3: Total rate of collaboration for different GESSs as a function of group
1 size α in the prisoner’s Dilemma
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2.5 Multiple Access Control
In this section we shortly introduce a possible refinement of our model, which
will be further investigated in future works. The idea is to distinguish between
interactions among members of the same group and of two different ones. We
study a particular example where we modify the group utility function defined
in (2.5), supposing that the immediate payoff matrix depends on the groups
the two players belong to (if its the same one or they belong to two different
groups).
The utility function of a group i playing qi against a population profile q−i
can be written as follows:




where by K(p,q) we denote the immediate expected payoff of an individual
playing p against a member of its own group using q, and by J(p,q) the
immediate expected payoff associated to interactions among individuals of
different groups.
We consider a particular application of this model in Aloha system, such
that a large population of mobile phones interfere with each other through
local pairwise interactions. The population of mobiles is decomposed into N
groups Gi, i = 1, 2, .., N of normalized size αi with
∑N
j=1 αi = 1 and each
mobile can decide either to transmit (T ) or to not transmit (S) a packet to
the receiver within transmission range. The interferences occur according to
the Aloha protocol, which assume that if more than one neighbor of a receiver
transmits a packet at the same time this causes a collision and the failure of
transmission. The channel is assumed to be ideal for transmission and the only
errors occurring are due to these collisions.
We denote by µ the probability that a mobile k has its receiver R(k) in its range.
When the mobile k transmits to the receiver R(k), all the other mobiles within
a circle of radius R centered on R(k) cause interference to k and thus the failure
of mobile’s k packet transmission to R(k).
A mobile belonging to a given group i may use a mixed strategy pi =
(pi, 1 − pi), where pi (resp. 1 − pi) is the probability to choose the action (T )
(resp (S)). Let γ be the probability that a mobile is alone in a given local
interaction; before transmission, the tagged mobile doesn’t know if if there is
another transmitting mobile within its range of transmission.
Let P1 (resp. P2) be the immediate payoff matrix associated to interactions
among mobiles belonging to the same group (resp. to two different ones):
P1 ≡
( T S
T −2δ 1− δ








where 0 < δ < 1 is the cost of transmitting the package. The definition of
the matrix P1 implies that, when two mobiles of the same group i interfere,
any successful transmission is equally rewarding for the group i. The resulting
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expected payoffs of a mobile playing qi against a member belonging to its own
group and to a different one, using respectively the same strategy qi and a
different one qj are, respectively, the following:
K(qi,qi) = µ [qi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qi)− 2δqi)]
+(1− γ)(1− δ)(1− qi)qi]
= µqi[(1− δ)(2− γ)− 2(1− γ)qi]
J(qi,qj) = µqi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qj)− δqj ]
= µqi[1− δ − (1− γ)qj ]
The expected utility of group i is then given by:




By following the same line of analysis followed in section 2.2, the strategy q
is a GESS if ∀i = 1, . . . N the two following conditions are satisfied:
1. F ′i (pi,q) ≡ (qi−pi)[1−δ+(1−γ)(αi(1−δ−2qi)−
∑N
j=1 αjqj)] ≥ 0 ∀pi,
2. If F ′i (pi,q) = 0 for some pi 6= qi, then (pi − qi)2(1− γ)αi > 0 ∀pi 6= qi.
We observe that, since the inequality (pi − qi)2(1 − γ)αi > 0 holds for all
values of the parameters, the second condition is always satisfied and thus the
first condition is sufficient for the existence of a GESS. We now characterize the
GESSs of the presented MAC game. With no loss of generality, we reorder the
groups so that α1 ≤ α2 . . . ≤ αN .
Proposition 5. In the presented MAC game, we find that:
• The pure symmetric strategy (S, . . . , S) is never a GESS.
• If a group Gi adopts pure strategy S, then at the equilibrium, all smaller
groups also use S.
• If a group Gi adopts pure strategy T , then at the equilibrium, all smaller
groups transmit. If the bigger group GN use strategy T at the equilibrium,
then γ > γ̄.
• If a group Gi adopts an equilibrium mixed strategy qi ∈]0, 1[, then if
qi >
1−δ
2 , at the equilibrium all smaller groups use pure strategy T , whereas
if qi <
1−δ
2 , smaller groups play S.
• The unique fully mixed GESS of the game is q∗ = (q∗1 , . . . , q∗N ), given by:
q∗i =
(1− δ)(1 + γ + (1− γ)(2 +N)αi)
2(N + 2)(1− γ)αi
(2.17)
under the condition: γ < γ.
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The thresholds γ and γ̄ are defined as follows:
γ ≡ min
αi
αi(N + 2)(1 + δ)− (1− δ)






αi(δ + 1) + 1
)
.
Proof. The proof is available in [60].
In order to provide a better insight, we consider a two groups MAC game,
in which we set a low value of the cost of transmission, δ = 0.2, and groups’
sizes α1 = α = 0.4, α2 = 1 − α = 0.6, and we let vary the value of the
parameter γ. We obtain three different equilibria, depending on the value of
γ: a pure GESS q∗P , a fully mixed GESS q
∗
M and a pure-mixed one q
∗
PM . In
figure 2.4 we plot the fully mixed and the pure GESS. For γ < γ = 0.3 the




2), whose components are shown in the
plot. Then, for γ = γ̄ > 0.53, q∗q∗P = (T, T ). We also represent the value of
q∗std := min(1,
1
1−γ −∆. We note that fully mixed equilibrium strategies adopted
by the two groups, q∗1 , q
∗
2 , are both lower then q
∗
std.























Figure 2.4: The value of the equilibrium strategy q∗1 and q
∗
2 in a two groups
MAC game as a function of γ for α = 0.4 compared to q∗std .
In figure 2.5 we plot the value of the second mixed component of the pure-
mixed GESS of the game: (T, qT ), which is an equilibrium in the interval
0 ≤ γ < 0.4, and we compare it to q∗std. We observe that, for the second
group the probability of transmitting is always lower w.r.t. the standard game.
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 23
















The value of qT in the pure−mixed equilibrium (T,qT)
Standard ESS
Figure 2.5: The value of the equilibrium strategy q∗2 of the second group in the
pure-mixed equilibrium (T, qT ) as a function of γ for α = 0.85 compared to q∗std
.
We denote by pS(p) the probability of a successful transmission in a
population whose profile is p. If N = 2, we obtain that:
pS(p) = µ[γ(αp1 + (1− α)p2)] + (1− γ)(2α2p1(1− p1)+
+ α(1− α)((1− p2)p1 + (1− p1)p2) + 2(1− α)2p2(1− p2))].
In figure 2.6 we represent the value of the equilibrium p∗S = pS(q
∗
M ) as a
function of γ for α = 0.4. We observe that, γ < γ, even if at the equilibrium
the probability of the transmission is lower in the groups game .
2.6 Conclusions
In this work we defined the new concept of the GESS, an Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy in a group-players context and we studied its relationship and
the Nash equilibrium and with the standard ESS. We studied some classical
examples of two players and two strategies games transposed in our group-
players framework and we found that the fact of considering interactions among
individuals maximizing their group’s utility (instead of their own one) impacts
individuals’ behavior and changes the structure of the equilibria. We briefly
introduce a refinement of our model, where we redefine the utility of a group
in order to consider different utilities for interactions among members of the
same group or of a different one. Through a particular example in MAC games
we showed how the presence of groups can encourage cooperative behaviors.
There are many possible issues to be developed in future studies. We are
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Figure 2.6: The probability pS(q
∗
M ) of a successful transmission for the fully
mixed GESS in a two groups MAC game at the equilibrium as a function of γ .
currently studying the replicator dynamics in this group-players games, in order
to investigate the existing relationship between the rest point of such dynamics
and our GESS, following the lines off he Folk Theorem of EG. At a more
theoretical level, the concept of group’s utility could be further investigated,
and the coexistence of both selfish and altruistic behaviors among individuals
could be taken into account.
